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AVENUE CANAL FAILURES IN NEW ORLEANS. 
 
W. Kanning S. Van Baars & J.K.Vrijling 
Delft University of Technology Delft University of Technology 
Delft, the Netherlands Delft, the Netherlands 
 
ABSTRACT 
The two failures of the London Avenue Canal floodwalls contributed largely to the flooding of central New Orleans due to hurricane 
Katrina. In this paper, both failures are analyzed and compared to each other since the flood defenses are both located on permeable 
soils. Photo’s observation and calculations are used for the analysis. Both failures are caused by the permeable sand layer below the 
floodwall that allowed high pore water pressures to develop below the floodwall. However, the south breach seems to be caused by 
the piping failure mechanism and the north breach by loss of stability. At the South breach, the impermeable top layer was thicker than 
at the North breach, increasing the stability. The North beach was less vulnerable for piping and the lack of stability caused a large 
breach. The London Avenue Canal failures are a clear yet tragic example of the failure of flood defenses on permeable soils. The 
failures show that multiple failure mechanism may occur and since there are many flood defenses on permeable soils world wide, the 
lessons from Katrina can be used to prevent future catastrophes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper it is investigated how the two floodwalls along 
the London Avenue Canal failed during the hurricane Katrina 
disaster in 2005. Photographic evidence, local observations 
and methods from the Netherlands are used to derive the 
possible causes of failure. The word levee (or floodwall) is 
used when discussing the New Orleans situation, while dyke is 
used when discussing the Dutch earthen flood defenses. 
Katrina in New Orleans 
The flood disaster in New Orleans in August and September 
2005 due to Hurricane Katrina showed once again the 
vulnerability of low lying areas to floods. Hurricane Katrina 
closely passed New Orleans, causing the flood defense system 
to breach on many locations. The severe effects shocked the 
world, with over 700 direct casualties, more than 100 billion 
US$ damage and an enormous social disruption. Hurricane 
Katrina approached New Orleans from the south on August 
28th, 2005, passing the city on the eastern side. The hurricane 
gained full force above the Gulf of Mexico. It caused the 
water levels on the coast to rise due to wind set up. The 
counter clockwise rotation of the hurricane magnified the 
wind set up near New Orleans. Besides, the high wind speeds 
of more than 250 km/hour resulted in a severe wave attack on 
the coast. The high water levels in Lake Borgne progressed 
into the city through shipping canals that connect the 
Mississippi River with the Gulf of Mexico and Lake 
Pontchartrain. As the hurricane passes the city, the winds on  
 
 
Lake Pontchartrain start to blow from the north, resulting in 
high water levels due to wind set-up on the north side of New 
Orleans (Kanning et al, 2007) 
 
Fig. 1. Levee breaches in New Orleans after Katrina 
A range of failure mechanisms was observed during hurricane 
Katrina. In general, three groups of failure mechanisms may 
be distinguished (see Fig. 1):  
I. Erosion of the flood defenses along Lake Borgne. These 
flood defenses mainly consisted of earthen embankments 
and were destroyed for many kilometers because the flood 
defenses were not high and strong enough to withstand 
the water levels and waves. 
II. Failure of flood walls and scour around transitions. The 
high water levels in Lake Borgne progressed into the 
Lake Pontchartrain 
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shipping canals that connect the Mississippi with Lake 
Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico. The floodwalls 
were not high enough or the transitions between soils and 
solid structures were not strong enough and erosion due to 
overtopping caused several failures. 
III. Geotechnical failure of floodwalls along two of the three 
dewatering canals. The wind induced high water levels 
along the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain progressed 
into the dewatering canals that enter the city. Although 
the water levels did not reach the design level, the 
floodwalls along these canals failed at three locations 
(two at London Avenue Canal and one at 17th Street 
Canal). 
 
This study focuses on the two London Avenue Canal failures. 
Netherlands and Flood Defenses 
The Netherlands are famous for the long history with flood 
defense systems. The flood defense principles in the 
Netherlands are used in this paper to analyze the London 
Avenue Canal failures. In response to numerous disasters, the 
construction of the current extensive flood defense system 
started less than a century ago. Firstly, following serious dyke 
breaching and flooding around the Southern Sea in 1912, it 
was decided that this inner sea be closed off, which was done 
by constructing the IJsselmeer Dam in 1933. Similarly, after 
the catastrophic flood disaster of 1953 in Zeeland it was 
decided to close off the islands in the southwest of the country 
from the sea. This was done by building 11 large dams and 
storm surge barriers, the construction of which was completed 
in 1997. Although the Dutch flood defense system has 
improved over the years, there were still serious dyke 
problems with high water in the rivers in 1988, 1993 and 1995, 
leading, in 1993, to 250,000 people being evacuated. And in 
2006, only 44% of the 2875 km Dutch dykes, dams and dunes 
met the dyke regulations set by the Ministry of Public Works, 
Transportation and Water Management. The IJsselmeer dam, 
among other defenses, does not meet the specified regulations. 
These regulations are based on the different type of failure 
mechanisms. According the regulations each dyke, dune or 
hydraulic structure has to be checked for each of the failure 
mechanisms.  
Failure Mechanisms 
In the Netherlands, the design and safety assessment of dykes 
is based on a list of failure mechanisms. In general, the 









- Wave overtopping 
- Sliding inner slope 
- Horizontal sliding  
- Sliding outer slope 
- Micro-instability 
- Piping 
- Erosion outer slope 
- Erosion foreshore 
- Settlement 
- Drifting ice 
- Ship Collision 
Dunes 
- Erosion 
- Erosion foreshore 
- Sliding inner slope 
 
Hydraulic structures 
- Strength/stability of structure 
- Strength/stability of foundation 
- Strength/stability of transition 
- Non closure of structure 
 
The piping failure mechanism (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) receives a lot 
of attention in the Netherlands nowadays because it was 
assessed to be the most dominant failure mechanism in a 
recent risk assessment. 
 
Fig. 2. Piping behind a dyke, next to the ditch 
 
Fig. 3. Emergency measures for the piping mechanism (ENW, 
2006) 
Piping 
A dyke fails due to piping in case the soil particles below the 
dyke are washed out due to excessive seepage. An example is 
shown in Fig. 4 for an earthen dyke with a clay blanket on top 
of a sand layer. Failures due to piping not only occurred in the 
Netherlands in the past, but also in Germany (Kolb, 1964). 
Four stages are defined: In the first stage, water pressures 
develop below the inside clay blanket. In the second stage, the 
clay blanket is cracked due to excessive pore pressures and 
sand boils start to develop. In the third phase, a canal develops 
below the dyke. In the fourth stage, this canal progressively 
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increases until an open connection between the outside water 
and the inside is formed. The open connection can finally 
cause the dyke to collapse due to subsidence and cracking of 






Fig. 4. Piping in case of an earthen dyke (TAW, 2002) 
 
Studies of the development of a pipe below a glass plate show 
that the pipe is not a single pipe, but a series of meandering 
pipes, creating new branches and closing some old ones, but 
progressively growing in length until it has reached the other 
side in case of high loading, see Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Development of pipes in an experimental setting 
The reliability of a dyke with respect to piping can be assessed 
with the methods of Bligh and Lane or with the more 
advanced method of Sellmeijer (Sellmeijer, 1988; TAW, 
2002). Sellmeijer takes into account the most influences and is 
used for the assessment of dykes in the Netherlands. 
According to Sellmeijer, a critical water level hp is defined: 







= − − > 
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 (1) 
Where α includes limited thickness of sand layer, c 
incorporates the erosion resistance of the sand layer, L is the 
leakage length, γp is the density of the grain particle, γw is the 
density of the water and θ is the rolling friction angle. Piping 
occurs in a corrected load H is higher than hp. H is the water 
level minus 0.3 × D (D is the layer thickness). For more 
information is referred to (TAW, 2002) 
Stability 
Floodwall instability proved to be a problem during hurricane 
Katrina in the nearby 17th Street Canal (IPET, 2006). The 
weak soils were not able to resist the pressure induced by the 
water and a large section of floodwall sled inland, see Fig. 6. 
Uplift however, was not the main reason for this failure. 
Horizontal stability under uplift conditions is a problem in the 
Netherlands as well. A river dyke failed due to this mechanism 
in the past (near Streefkerk), one real scale experiment was 
carried out to study the mechanism (near Bergambacht) and 
even a special addition to slope stability software was 
developed. 
 
Fig. 6. 17th Street Canal failure in New Orleans due to 
hurricane Katrina (ILIT, 2006) 
THE LONDON AVENUE CANAL 
Location 
The London Avenue Canal is located in the center of New 
Orleans. The canal was constructed for the dewatering of the 
central New Orleans area. Due to compaction of the subsoil 
following the dewatering of the former marsh, the area is 
situated below Mean Sea Level (MSL). Hence, all rain that 
falls has to be pumped out. A drainage system was constructed 
that drains all excess water by means of a pump station that is 
located at the south end of the canal. The north end of the 
canal has a curved shape to prevent waves from entering. The 
canal used to be in open connection with Lake Pontchartrain, 
but a closure structure with pumps is constructed which will 
be closed in case of high water, reducing the length of the 
overall flood defense system. 







Fig. 7. The London Avenue Canal (based on earth.google.com) 
Geology 
New Orleans is located in the Mississippi Delta. The 
Mississippi river formed the area in the course of many 
centuries and created typical delta geology that consist of 
natural levee deposits, organic soils, clay layers and sand 
layers. The Pleistocene layers are found at a depth of 15 to 30 
meters. The upper Holocene layers are characterized by highly 
compressible, low strength materials and beach sand deposits. 
The London Avenue Canal is located in an area that used to be 
a swamp and that was drained to create residential area. 
Organic, weak soils are found near the soil surface, see Fig. 8. 
Below the organic soils, clay and sand layers are found. 
Especially the highly permeable sand layers are important. 
These are beach sands or barrier island deposits. 
 
Fig. 8. Geology of the London Avenue Canal (Nelson, 2006) 
 
The London Avenue Canal Floodwalls 
The floodwalls of the London Avenue canal are all from the I-
wall type: A concrete wall on top of a steel sheet pile. The 
walls are constructed differently from the design. The walls 
are designed with an elevation of NGVD + 4.2 m and a tip 
elevation of the sheet pile ranging from NGVD -6.1 m to -13.4 
m. At the location of the breaches, the design sheet pile tip 
elevations are NGVD – 6.1 m while opposite of the North 
breach, the elevation is NGVD -10.7 m (Burk & Associates, 
1986). The design water level is 0.6 m below the top of the 
floodwall. The walls are constructed however with an 
elevation of NGVD + 4.4 m and a tip elevation of the sheet 
pile ranging from NGVD -3.6 m to -8.7 m. A study shows 
considerable changes in time of the different vertical datum. In 
this study, the NAVD88 (2004.65) reference is used, denoted 
with NAVD. This is approximately 0.46 m lower than the 
NGVD datum and 0.06 m above local mean sea level (IPET, 
2006A, pp II-93, 94) 
 
At the location of the breaches, the as-built sheet pile tip 
elevations are NGVD – 4.9 m while opposite of the North 
breach, the elevation is NGVD - 8.7 m (USACE, 1994). The 
floodwalls have a height of NAVD + 3.9 m. (IPET, 2006A p 
II-94). The canal floor is approximately 5.5 to 5.8 m below sea 
level (Team Louisiana, 2006 p 99). The canal depths are 
maintained with dredging. 
Water Levels 
The most important parameter for failure is the water level. 
There are hardly observations of the water levels during 
hurricane Katrina. Most water levels in literature are based on 
model results. These models have been calibrated with the 
available observations. The nearest observation-based 
hydrograph is near the entrance of the 17th Street Canal 
(approximately 4.7 km away from the London Avenue Canal 
entrance), see Fig. 9, where a maximum water level of NAVD 
+3.3 m is recorded. Interpolation by IPET based on high water 
marks results in a water level in the London Avenue Canal of 
approximately NAVD +3.5 m (IPET, 2006A, p. IV-31). Fig. 9 
shows the peak between 6 and 11 ft only lasts for about 6 
hours. The floodwalls not necessarily failed at the maximum 
water level. According to IPET, the water level at the South 
breach was approximately between NAVD +2.2 m and +2.5 m 
(IPET, 2006A, p. V-39) and the water level at the North 
breach was approximately between NAVD +2.5 m and +2.9 m 
(IPET, 2006A p. V-40). Since time dependent processes may 
be involved, the complete hydrograph has to be taken into 
account. 
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Fig. 9. Observed water levels at the 17th Street Canal (IPET, 
2006A pp IV-30) 
Other indications give additional information about the water 
levels: 
• No scour behind the floodwalls is observed (unlike 
floodwall along the Inner Harbor Navigation 
Channel), indicating the water levels remained below 
the top of the floodwall 
• The Robert E. Lee Boulevard Bridge, next to the 
north breach, is lower than the adjacent floodwalls, 
creating a gap in the system of flood defenses. 
• The two breaches are both on the same canal. This 
indicated the South breach probably failed first: In 
case the north breach would have failed first, the 
water level at the South breach would have dropped 
since its ‘supply’ would have to pass the north breach. 
Vice versa is not necessarily true since water levels at 
the north breach experience less influence of the 
south breach because a gradient of the water level 
will develop in a relatively small canal. The thick 
layer of sand at the South breach indicates the water 
flowed in for a significant amount of time. 
THE SOUTH BREACH OF THE LONDON AVENUE 
CANAL 
The south breach is located on the east side of the London 
Avenue Canal near Mirabeau Avenue. The floodwall 
supposedly failed between 07.00 and 08.00 am on August 29th, 
2007. The water level was approximately NAVD + 2.5 m 
which is well below the top of the floodwall (NAVD +3.9 m) 
and below the design level (NAVD +3.3 m). 
Forensic Evidence 
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show that (in contradiction to the North 
breach) the I-walls did not fall over, but sank down. The 
breach is relatively small and consists only of a few elements. 
The pictures indicate that first a large amount of sand washed 
from below the floodwall through piping underneath the I-wall 
which made it possible for the I-walls to sink down in the 
liquefied sand layer. 
 
Fig. 10. Initial repairs on the South breach (source: IPET, 
2006A) 
 
Fig. 11. The South breach after initial repairs (source: W. 
Kanning) 
 
Fig. 12. Sand layer in vicinity of the London Avenue Canal 
south breach (source: W. Kanning) 
 
Fig. 13. Sand layer covering the patio of a house in the 
vicinity of the London Avenue canal south breach (source: J.K. 
Vrijling) 
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Cross Section 
The cross section of Fig. 14 is based on literature (IPET, 
2006B) and personal surveying. This cross section serves as 
the basis for the computations in the next sections. The ILIT 
study divides the swamp/marsh layer into two layers which 
together have the same thickness as depicted below. The 
beach sand layer is also divided into two layers in this study 
(ILIT, 2006, pp. 8-119). The height of the floodwall is NAVD 
+3.9 m; the depth of the sheet pile is NAVD -5.3 m below sea 
level (IPET, 2006B pV-9-30). The thickness of the inland 
blanket that consists of marsh deposits is approximately 3.6 m. 
 
Fig. 14. Cross section London Avenue Canal South breach 
based on (IPET, 2006B) and own measurements. Measures in 
meters; reference according to NAVD88 
Stability analysis 
In case of a levee and a blanket on top of permeable layer, an 
uplift situation occurs. To determine the effect of hydraulic 
pressures, the uplift criterion is analyzed. The vertical stress 
due to the blanket is: 
 
3 23.6 m 15.7 kN/m 56.5 kN/mv blanket blankethσ γ= ⋅ = ⋅ =
 (2) 
 
Where σv is vertical stress, γblanker is the density of the blanket 
material and hblanket is the thickness of the blanket. The 




56.5 kN/mh / 5.7 m
10 kN/mv water
σ γ∆ = = =  (3) 
 
This corresponds to a water level at NAVD -4.7 + 5.7 = 
NAVD + 1.0 m. This is far below the occurring water level of 
approximately NAVD +2.5 m at failure (see section 2.4). The 
peak water level only last for several hours but the very 
permeable sand layer enables a rapid increase in pore water 
pressure. Since there is uplift of the inland blanket, the 
effective vertical stresses are 0, which means no shear stresses 
can develop. Hence, all kind of possible failure planes may 
develop. 
Piping 
Different methods to asses the vulnerability for piping are 
used in this study. The impermeable layer on top of the sand 
layer should have been cracked (due to uplift). In the previous 
section was shown that critical water levels for uplift were 
lower than the occurring water levels. Since not all parameters 
are known, the results should be regarded as rough estimates. 
The methods of Bligh, Lane and Sellmeijer all indicate the 
structure is sensitive to piping, see Table 1. In this table, ∆hmax 
is the maximum occurred water level and hcritical is the critical 
water level for piping. The leakage length is estimated to 23 m; 
the coefficient of Bligh is 15 m and the coefficient of Lane 7 
m. For Sellmeijer, the rolling friction angle is 43 degrees, d50 
is 0.23 mm and the permeability is 4*10-4 m/s. For other 
coefficients is referred to TAW (1999). As can be seen in Fig. 
9, the water levels are a few hours above critical water levels. 
Table 1: Piping sensitivity London Avenue Canal South 
breach 
Assessment method ∆hmax (m) hcritical (m) Sensitive 
Bligh  4.6 1.5 (2.4)* Yes 
Lane 4.6 1.6 Yes 
Sellmeijer 4.6 3.2 (4.3)* Yes 
*Corrected for vertical leakage length 
Conclusion South Breach 
The photos, local observations and calculations indicate the 
floodwall failed due to the piping mechanism. The 
calculations indicate that both stability and piping were critical 
for the London Avenue Canal south breach. The excess pore 
water pressure in the sand layer was relieved due to cracks in 
the blanket. These cracks caused the first sand boils. Why the 
piping mechanism occurred exactly here, and not at any 
adjacent location is probably because of spatial variation and 
local discontinuities (e.g. swimming pools, trees). 
THE NORTH BREACH OF THE LONDON AVENUE 
CANAL 
The North breach of the London Avenue Canal is located on 
the west side of the Canal near the Robert E. Lee boulevard 
bridge. An analysis of the Army Corps of Engineers shows 
that the floodwall failed at a water level of NAVD + 2.7 m 
(IPET, 2006A p IV-173) which is well below the top of the 
floodwall and even below design level. 
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Forensic Evidence 
Fig. 15 shows the North breach of the London Avenue canal. 
A large part of the I-wall has been pushed inland leaving a 
large breach. The breach consists of 2 parts: a part of tumbled 
segments and a gap without segments. This indicated the 
floodwall first deformed over the full length, before the gap 
developed (since the pressure was relieved from the tumbled 
part). Fig. 16, Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 show the elevation of the 
ground behind the embankment, including the elevation of a 
playhouse. This heave is a clear sign of an uplift failure 
mechanism. Besides, sand boils have been found here (IPET, 
2006A).  
 
Fig. 15. The London Avenue Canal North breach (IPET, 
2006A) 
 
Fig. 16. Elevated playhouse due to uplift (ILIT, 2006 pp 8-131) 
 
Fig. 17. The playhouse before the breach (source: IPET, 
2006A pV-41) 
 
Fig. 18. The playhouse after the breach (source: IPET, 2006A 
p V-41) 
Fig. 19 shows holes behind the floodwall opposite of the 
breach which are likely caused by piping, the particles have 
been washed out and a hole remains. The floodwall did not 
fail here because the sheet pile was longer than on the opposite 
site. Fig. 20 shows the only part of the floodwall where the 
concrete notably breached: at the connection between the 
tumbled wall and the surviving wall. Fig. 20 indicates that the 
soil failed and not the structure (i.e. concrete wall and sheet 
pile). Only at the connection between the tumbled floodwall 
and the surviving floodwall, cracks in the concrete I wall are 
observed. 
 
Fig. 19. Piping holes at the protected side of the floodwall 
opposite the breach of the London Avenue Canal North breach 
(source: IPET, 2006A) 
 
Fig. 20. Cracked concrete floodwall at the London Avenue 
Canal north breach (source: J.K. Vrijling) 
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Cross Section 
The cross section of Fig. 21 is based on literature (IPET, 2006) 
and own measurements. The height of the floodwall is NAVD 
+3.9 m; the depth of the sheet pile is NAVD -5.4 m (IPET, 
2006B p V-9-2). The thickness of the inland blanket that 
consists of marsh deposits is approximately 2.8 m. 
 
Fig. 21. Cross section London Avenue Canal North Breach 
Stability Analysis 
Similar the South breach, the uplift criterion is analyzed. The 
vertical stress due to the blanket is: 
 
3 22.75 m 16.5 kN/m 45.3 kN/mv blanket blankethσ γ= ⋅ = ⋅ =
 (4) 
 
The corresponding critical water level difference (assuming no 
entrance resistance) is: 
2
3
45.3 kN/m/ 4.5 m
10 kN/mv water
h σ γ∆ = = =  (5) 
 
This correspond to a water level at NAVD -4.4 + 4.5 = NAVD 
+ 0.1 m. This is far below the occurring water level of 
approximately NAVD + 2.5 to + 2.8 at failure (see section 2.4). 
Even below the floodwall the effective stresses and so the 
strength reduce to zero at rather low water levels. This low 
critical water level also explains why residents complained 
about wet gardens along the London Avenue Canal. The peak 
water level only last for several hours but the very permeable 
sand result in a rapid increase in water levels. Since there is 
uplift of the inland blanket, the effective vertical stresses are 0, 
which means no shear stresses can develop. Hence, all kind of 
possible failure planes may develop.  
 
The embankment on top of the swamp marsh layer results in a 
vertical stress on top of the sand below the embankment of: 
 




85.0 kN/m/ 8.5 m
10 kN/mv water
h σ γ∆ = = =  (7) 
The corresponding critical water level is NAVD -4.4 + 8.5 
=NAVD + 4.1 m which is above the water levels that occurred. 
Piping 
The methods of Bligh, Lane indicate the structure is sensitive 
to piping, see Table 2. The method of Sellmeijer shows less 
sensitivity for piping, mainly because of the low permeability 
of the sand. The leakage length is estimated to 24 m; the 
coefficient of Bligh is 15 m and the coefficient of Lane 7 m. 
For Sellmeijer, the rolling friction angle is 43 degrees, d50 is 
0.23 mm and the permeability is 6*10-5 m/s. For other 
coefficients is referred to TAW (1999). Since not all 
parameters are known, the outcomes should be treated 
carefully. 
Table 2: Piping sensitivity London Avenue Canal North 
breach 
Assessment method ∆Hmax (m) Hcritical (m) Sensitive 
Bligh  5.2 1.5 (2.4)* Yes 
Lane 5.2 1.6 Yes 
Sellmeijer 5.2 5.6 (6.7)* Yes 
*Corrected for vertical leakage length 
Conclusion North Breach 
Forensic evidence and observations indicates the floodwalls 
failed due to stability problems caused by a combination of the 
large water pressure on the wall and the large excess pore 
pressure in the subsoil. This is confirmed by the stability 
calculations. The different piping assessment methods are not 
consistent whether the structure was sensitive for piping or not. 
The floodwall may failed at this location because of the 
presence of a extra weak peat layer. 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES  
The two failure mechanisms of the floodwalls look different, 
but are both based on the same fundamental principle: The 
pore pressure in the sand layer reached the total vertical 
stresses, reducing the effective stresses and the strength to 
zero, causing the floodwall to sink down due to piping (South 
breach) or fall sideways (North breach). Due to the zero 
effective stresses, all kind of deformations and failure 
mechanisms are possible.  
 
The similarity of both failures is the high excess pore pressure 
in the sand layer, leading to uplift forces on inland blanket and 
floodwall instabilities. The difference is the effect it had on the 
final way of failing. The North floodwall tumbled over, but 
the South floodwall did not tumble over, because the thicker 
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clay layer in South seems to have prevented the I-wall to 
tumble by giving more passive resistance. The floodwall only 
sank down because piping had washed away the sand below 
 
This outcome of the calculations have changed the question: 
“why did the uplift and instability in the North breach and the 
uplift and piping in South breach happen?” to “why aren’t 
there more failures?”. Is this because these two failures 
reduced the load on the rest of the floodwall? Probably it was, 
since the inundation of the area behind reduced the water 
levels in the canals and thus the load on the floodwalls. 
Furthermore, the effective stresses increased and therefore 
increased the strength of the subsoil. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
There are several failure mechanisms that can cause a 
floodwall on permeable soils to fail. The London Avenue 
Canal breaches are a clear case study to investigate how the 
different mechanisms can contribute. Both breaches occurred 
due to high excess pores pressures in the sand below the flood 
defenses. It was concluded that the North breach occurred due 
to a lack of stability and the South breach occurred due to 
piping. This result is of importance for all other flood defenses 
on permeable soils, although is should never be forgotten that 
other failure mechanisms can contribute as well. The failures 
show that multiple failure mechanism may occur and since 
there are many flood defenses on permeable soils, the lessons 
from Katrina may be used to prevent future catastrophes world 
wide. 
 
In the Netherlands it is commonly thought that piping is 
mainly a problem during long lasting loads, hence during 
flood waves on rivers that last for days or weeks. The idea is 
that it takes quite some time for pore water pressures to build 
up and for the sand particles to be removed. The main 
attention for piping is therefore on river dykes. However, the 
London Avenue Canal South breach revealed that piping can 
occur very rapidly for specific conditions (uncovered 
permeably layers with small entrance resistance) as well. 
Besides, the London Avenue Canal North breach once again 
emphasized the importance of the stability under uplift 
mechanism. 
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